ABSTRACT
George Edward Moore, in his quest to establish a direct realist account of cognition and to refute skepticism and absolute idealism, which is a brand of metaphysical monism, argued that at least some of our beliefs about the world are absolutely certain. Moore argues that these beliefs are ‘commonsense’. All the arguments put forth by G.E. Moore in his classic works; A Defense of Commonsense, Proof of An External World, The Nature of Judgment, Refutation of Idealism andA Reply to My Critics are all in a bid to prove the existence of an absolute external world whose existence is perceivable (knowable) via the ‘Commonsense’ understanding of reality (actuality). Although, Moore’s direct realist account of cognition states that perception or cognition of the external world is gained via the senses directly unmediated, such that there is no gap between the human mind and external world objects. However, it was discovered that the relationship between the distal stimulus and its percept was indirect; though for Moore the relationship between the distal stimulus and its percept is direct. Moore’s ontological account of cognition was quite unique and illuminating; however his ontological account of cognition was inadequate. The tenability of Moore’s position is questionable because it can only be sustained on the basis of naturalization of all epistemological account of cognition in relation to a given consensual language domain.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background of the Study
This research work was motivated by some of the intricate
issues raised by Absolute idealism (Metaphysical monism) to interpret with certainty and objectivity existent reality. Some of these issues are summarized as follows:
(i) All realities are internally related (doctrine of internal relations)
(ii) The objective truths (for example, of logic mathematics, ethics, etc) are to be accounted for in terms of the operations of the subjective cognitive or psychological faculties (psychologism).
(iii) Objective knowledge is of the universal.
(iv) There exist universal minds to which others are subsumed.
(v) Phenomenological and external realities are copies of original that exist in the world of forms.
